Application of Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) to UK rail safety of the line incidents by Madigan, Ruth et al.
Madigan, Ruth and Golightly, David and Madders, 
Richard (2016) Application of Human Factors Analysis 
and Classification System (HFACS) to UK rail safety of 
the line incidents. Accident, Analysis and Prevention, 
97 . pp. 122-131. ISSN 0001-4575 
Access from the University of Nottingham repository: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/36266/1/ApplicationofHumanFactorsAnalysisandClassificatio
nSystemtoUKRailSafetyoftheLineIncidents_AcceptedPaper.pdf
Copyright and reuse: 
The Nottingham ePrints service makes this work by researchers of the University of 
Nottingham available open access under the following conditions.
This article is made available under the Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No 
Derivatives licence and may be reused according to the conditions of the licence.  For more 
details see: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or from the version of 
record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version. Please 
see the repository url above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription.
For more information, please contact eprints@nottingham.ac.uk
1 
 
Application of Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) to 1 
UK rail safety of the line incidents 2 
Ruth Madigan a, David Golightly b, & Richard Madders c 3 
 4 
a Institute for Transport Studies, University of Leeds, Leeds, LS2 9JT, United Kingdom 5 
b Human Factors Research Group, Innovative Technology Research Centre, Department of 6 
Mechanical, Materials and Manufacturing Engineering, University of Nottingham, University Park, 7 
Nottingham, NG7 2RD. 8 
c Arcadia Alive Ltd., 8 The Quadrant, 99 Parkway Avenue, Sheffield, S9 4WG 9 
 10 
 11 
 12 
 13 
 14 
 15 
 16 
 17 
 18 
 19 
 20 
 21 
2 
 
Abstract 22 
Minor safety incidents on the railways cause disruption, and may be indicators of more serious safety 23 
risks. The following paper aimed to gain an understanding of the relationship between active and 24 
latent factors, and particular causal paths for these types of incidents by using the Human Factors 25 
Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) to examine rail industry incident reports investigating such 26 
events. 78 reports across 5 types of incident were reviewed by two authors and cross-referenced for 27 
interrater reliability using the index of concordance. The results indicate that the reports were strongly 28 
focused on active failures, particularly those associated with work-related distraction and 29 
environmental factors. Few latent factors were presented in the reports. Different causal pathways 30 
emerged for memory failures for events such a failure to call at stations, and attentional failures which 31 
were more often associated with signals passed at danger. The study highlights a need for the rail 32 
industry to look more closely at latent factors at the supervisory and organisational levels when 33 
investigating minor safety of the line incidents. The results also strongly suggest the importance of a 34 
new factor – operational environment – that captures unexpected and non-routine operating 35 
conditions which have a risk of distracting the driver. Finally, the study is further demonstration of the 36 
utility of HFACS to the rail industry, and of the usefulness of the index of concordance measure of 37 
interrater reliability.   38 
Keywords: HFACS, System Analysis, Rail, Accident Investigation,  39 
1. Introduction  40 
In the period from 2001 to 2014 there were 803 fatalities (excluding suicides) and 5794 major 41 
injuries on the UK rail network (Department for Transport, 2014).  Although, the rail industry has an 42 
excellent safety record in comparison to other forms of transport (Department for Transport, 2014), 43 
the Office of Road & Rail has put forward a safety vision for zero workforce and industry-caused 44 
passenger fatalities, and an ever-decreasing overall safety risk (ORR, 2014).  If we are to move towards 45 
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a realisation of this vision, it is important to gain a detailed understanding of all of the factors which 46 
contribute to accidents and incidents in order to put appropriate controls in place. 47 
Recent analyses have argued that human error was a causal factor in the occurrence of many 48 
serious and fatal rail accidents, both in the UK (French & Cope, 2012) and across Europe (Kyriakidis, 49 
Pak, & Majumdar, 2015). On top of these more serious incidents, there are many hundreds of minor 50 
incidents within the UK rail industry, many of which are also attributed to driver error. These include 51 
speed exceedances and signals passed at danger (SPADs) that did not lead to any accidents, along with 52 
trains that stop short or overshoot their platform, or fail to call altogether. These types of incident are 53 
extremely costly for organisations due to fines and infrastructure costs, along with disruption leading 54 
to negative public opinion. The most recent National Rail Passenger Survey showed that 55 
punctuality/reliability was the factor with the biggest impact on overall customer satisfaction, and 56 
how a train company dealt with delays had the biggest impact on overall dissatisfaction (NRPS, 2016). 57 
Additional costs arise as these incidents often require a driver to be removed from duty for an 58 
investigation and possibly retraining. Furthermore, the concern is that a minor event is an indicator of 59 
the risk of a more serious incident in the future (Reason, 1997; Hollnagel, 2014).  60 
The opportunity for minor safety of the line events to occur is huge. For example, the number 61 
of approaches to red signals annually in the UK may be in the region of 7.5m (Gibson, Mills, Basacik, 62 
& Harrison, 2015). Few of these result in actual SPADs, and error probability for SPADs or events such 63 
as wrong side door openings (Basacik and Gibson, 2015) suggests error rates may be approaching the 64 
limits of performance. Therefore, careful analysis of events is required if new levels of safety are to be 65 
achieved, and there is a need for rail companies to understand what causes these events, so that 66 
potential courses of remedial action can be identified including training, technical or procedural 67 
change. 68 
Contemporary human factors approaches to system safety have been used to provide greater 69 
insights into the causes of accidents in many safety-critical domains (Lenné, Salmon, Liu, & Trotter, 70 
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2012). Much of this work has been based on Reason’s (1990) Generic Error Modelling System (GEMS), 71 
which defines two broad categories of error: active and latent failures. Active errors are associated 72 
with the front-line operators of a system, and their effects usually become evident almost 73 
immediately. Latent (or hidden) errors refer to the errors of designers or managers, and their  adverse 74 
consequences may lie dormant within the system for a long time, only becoming evident when they 75 
combine with other factors to breach the system’s defences. Reason (1990) noted that latent errors 76 
may pose the greatest risk to system safety because unless they are identified they remain in a system 77 
despite attempts to resolve an issue through rectifying the immediate performance issue (e.g. through 78 
non-systemic equipment fixes or training). Thus, one of the most important aspects of Reason’s model 79 
is the argument that human error is a consequence, not a cause, of latent failures; and that “it is only 80 
by understanding the context that provoked an error can we hope to limit its reoccurrence” (Reason, 81 
1997, p.126). As a result of the issues outlined above, there is currently a strong emphasis on tackling 82 
human factors within the rail industry (e.g. Atkins, 2003; FRA, 2007; Lawton & Ward, 2005; RSSB, 83 
2009), and as part of this process it is vital that both the active and latent failures which contribute to 84 
railway incidents are understood. 85 
1.1 Human Factors Analysis & Classification System 86 
A number of studies have used different frameworks to look at the factors contributing to 87 
specific types of railway incident i.e. SPADs (e.g. Edkins & Pollock, 1997; Lawton & Ward, 2005; Rjabovs 88 
and Palacin, 2016), and specific types of error e.g. communication errors (Murphy, 2001). Read, Lenné, 89 
and Moss (2012) used the Contributing Factors Framework to investigate the associations between 90 
factors involved in Australian rail accidents and found that task demand factors (e.g. high workload, 91 
distraction) were significantly associated with skill-based errors; knowledge and training deficiencies 92 
significantly associated with mistakes; and violations significantly linked to social environmental 93 
factors. Currently, the UK rail sector is working towards a database of trends and themes in human 94 
performance and incident underlying causes for a sample of high risk Great British (GB) rail incidents. 95 
5 
 
This database uses the Incident Factor Classification System (IFCS) of 10 factors that may shape human 96 
performance in rail incidents (Gibson et al., 2015). However, one of the most common frameworks for 97 
analysis, based on Reason’s (1990) model, is the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System 98 
(HFACS; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).  HFACS describes four levels of failure based on Reason’s Swiss 99 
Cheese Model (Reason, Hollnagel, & Paries, 2006): unsafe acts, preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe 100 
supervision, and organisational influences (see Figure 1). Critically, this model specifies that in order 101 
for an incident to occur, failures in defences at all levels of the system must line up, thus highlighting 102 
the importance of identifying the factors which contribute at each level. The unsafe acts level focuses 103 
on identifying any errors or violations made by front line workers that led to an accident or incident 104 
occurring. Within the error category there are three subcategories of skill-based error, decision error, 105 
and perceptual error. Decision errors can be further broken down into rule-based and choice-based 106 
decisions, and skill-based errors can be broken down to attentional and memory failures. Within the 107 
violations category there are two subcategories of routine and exceptional violations. 108 
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 109 
Figure 1: The HFACS framework (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003)  110 
The second level of the HFACS framework is “preconditions for unsafe acts”. These refer to 111 
the immediate underlying conditions that contribute to the occurrence of unsafe acts. This level 112 
comprises three categories: condition of operators, environmental factors, and personnel factors. 113 
Each of these categories has a number of subcategories as shown in Figure 1. The third level within 114 
HFACS is “unsafe supervision”. This considers the situations where supervision was either lacking or 115 
unsuitable and has four categories of inadequate supervision, planned inappropriate operations, 116 
failure to correct a problem, and supervisory violations. The fourth and final level within many 117 
applications of HFACS models is organisational influences. This level looks at the failures occurring at 118 
the higher managerial levels of the organisation which contributed to an accident, focusing on the 119 
subcategories of resource management, organisational climate and organisational process.  120 
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Typically, HFACS is used as a retrospective tool for analysing accident and incident reports, 121 
and the different failures which contributed to an accident at all four levels are identified. Although 122 
originally designed to classify aviation accidents (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001; 2003), HFACS has now 123 
been applied successfully in numerous safety critical industries including maritime (Celik & Cebi, 124 
2009), mining (Lenné et al., 2012; Patterson & Shappell, 2010), medicine (ElBardissi, Wiegmann, 125 
Dearani, Daly, & Sundt, 2007) and rail (Baysari, McIntosh, & Wilson, 2008; Reinach & Viale, 2006), with 126 
researchers making various adaptations to the model to make it more suitable in different contexts. 127 
One criticism of HFACS has been its failure to consider contributory factors outside of the organisation 128 
involved, such as government policy, or local authority oversights (Salmon, Cornelissen, & Trotter, 129 
2012). For that reason, some versions have gone beyond the organisational level to include ‘external 130 
influences’ which take account of issues such as legislation gaps, administration oversights, and design 131 
flaws (e.g. Chen, Wall, Davies, Yang, Wang, & Chou, 2013; Reinach & Viale, 2006).   132 
Overall, the results of previous studies provide strong support for the use of HFACS as a tool 133 
for understanding incidents in the rail industry. However, only two published studies have applied 134 
HFACS in this context. Reinach and Viale (2006) used an adapted version called HFACS-RR to examine 135 
six railyard switching incidents in the US and identified 36 probable contributing factors for these 136 
incidents. Baysari et al. (2008) investigated 40 publicly available railway incident and accident reports 137 
in Australia and identified 330 contributing factors. More than half of the incidents identified resulted 138 
from an equipment failure. In the remaining cases, skill-based errors (HFACS Level 1), adverse mental 139 
state (Level 2), and equipment/facility resources (Level 4) emerged as the most common contributory 140 
factors.  141 
Both Baysari et al. (2008) and Read et al.’s (2012) studies focus on external inquiries into major 142 
accidents by relevant transport bodies (e.g. Australian Safety Transport Bureau), while the Reinach 143 
and Viale (2006) study focuses solely on switching yard incidents. However, to date, no published 144 
study has focused on the hundreds of minor incidents linked to train drivers every year, such as signals 145 
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passed at danger or failure to call at stations. As previously noted, these incidents can have extremely 146 
damaging consequences in terms of both infrastructure costs and negative public opinion. In addition, 147 
the causal pattern of these incidents is often similar to that of more serious incidents (Wright & Van 148 
der Schaaf, 2004). Although human error is often identified as a causal factor within these incidents, 149 
there has been little effort to gain a systematic understanding of the latent factors which contribute, 150 
and whether or not these differ depending on the type of incident which occurs. Studies across other 151 
industries e.g. outdoor activity incidents, have shown the potential to identify multiple contributory 152 
factors, both active and latent, from similar minor events, thus emphasizing the potential explanatory 153 
power of these incidents (e.g. Salmon, Goode, Lenné, Finch & Cassell, 2014; Salmon, Goode, Taylor, 154 
Lenné, Dallat, & Finch, in press). Therefore, gaining an understanding of minor safety-of-the-line 155 
incidents is important to provide rail companies with the tools to prevent similar and more serious 156 
incidents occurring in the future.   157 
HFACS was chosen as the tool for the purposes of this study into the analysis of safety of the 158 
line incidents. This was due to the number of studies generally that have used HFACS, its wide 159 
availability and research base that makes its application clear and results transferrable, and its prior 160 
use within the rail sector. 161 
1.2 Reliability and Report Quality 162 
Although a number of strengths of the HFACS model have been identified, including its 163 
detailed classification of the organisational context (Baysari, Caponecchia, McIntosh, & Wilson, 2009), 164 
and its ability to provide safety professionals with a theoretically based tool for accident investigations 165 
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001); a number of papers have identified some concerns with the reliability 166 
of the model. Beaubien and Baker (2002) and Olsen (2011) criticized the validation evidence 167 
supporting the usefulness of the HFACS system, as it was all collected and analysed by the developers 168 
of the framework. However, other authors have now successfully used and proven the system in a 169 
variety of industries (Baysari et al., 2008; Lenné et al., 2012, Li & Harris, 2006; Reinach & Viale, 2006). 170 
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Another concern raised by Olsen (2011) is the use of incorrect statistics for the reporting of HFACS 171 
reliability levels. It is argued that Cohen’s Kappa is an inadequate measure of reliability, as it is based 172 
on the argument that coders who are coding randomly will agree by chance a certain percentage of 173 
the time, and that this should be deducted from the agreement that is not achieved by chance. 174 
However in incident classification systems, coders are not randomly assigning codes but are actually 175 
trying to identify the same causal factors, and therefore agreements are not chance events (Olsen, 176 
2011).  For this reason, Olsen argues that the correct method for calculating inter-coder consensus is 177 
to calculate the index of concordance which takes into account both the total number of agreements 178 
and the total number of disagreements of raters’ codes. An additional issue is that a number of authors 179 
have highlighted difficulties with the clarity of error codes within HFACS, particularly in derivatives of 180 
HFACS such as HFACS-ADF (Olsen & Shorrock, 2010) and HFACS-DoD (O’Connor & Walker, 2011). 181 
Baysari et al. (2008) reported a large difference in the number of errors identified by the three raters 182 
in their study, with percentage agreement ranging from 40-75%, and as a result they only reported 183 
the ratings of the first author in their paper. Thus, in this paper the index of concordance is used to 184 
evaluate the reliability of HFACS as a tool for the categorisation of UK rail incident reports by two 185 
Human Factors experts.  186 
As outlined in Section 1.1, one of the main benefits of HFACS is in identifying latent factors 187 
that can contribute to accident causation. However, this is dependent on the quality of investigation 188 
and subsequent reporting of accidents. While significant rail accidents are subject to extensive 189 
reporting, it was unclear whether it would be possible to identify latent features of accidents, at both 190 
organisational levels and beyond, in the type of reports generated for minor safety of the line 191 
incidents, or whether these investigations focus more on surface-level features relating to unsafe acts 192 
and their preconditions. Rjabovs and Palacin (2015) found that there was a tendancy not to attribute 193 
systemic, physical or design factors to the causation of SPADs in a metro environment, and it is likely 194 
that a similar issue might arise when looking at other types of rail transport. Therefore, this paper also 195 
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aimed to measure the quality and depth of the information contained in minor incident investigation 196 
reports. 197 
1.3 Purpose of current study 198 
This paper presents an application of HFACS as an analysis tool to aid with the understanding of 199 
the factors that contribute to minor operational incidents in the UK rail. It aims to investigate the 200 
breakdown of causal factors for these incidents, and in doing so evaluate whether the patterns found 201 
in Baysari et al. (2008) are replicated in the UK rail industry. The study focuses on incidents which have 202 
previously been defined as being caused by Human Error and addresses five key questions: 203 
1. Can HFACS help us to identify the precursors of minor operational incidents? 204 
2. Are there any differences in the causation paths of different types of incident e.g. SPAD vs 205 
station overrun? 206 
3. What is the breakdown of active and latent factors that contribute to this type of incident and 207 
does this vary across incident types? 208 
4. What is the quality of reporting of minor incidents in the rail industry? Is report content 209 
sufficient to support the identification of latent factors of incident causation, including 210 
organisational and regulatory? 211 
5. How reliably can two independent Human Factors experts’ code investigation reports using 212 
HFACS? 213 
2. Method  214 
2.1 Data Sources 215 
Incident investigation reports were collected from seven of the UK’s Train Operating 216 
Companies (TOCs).  These incidents had all been previously classified by the TOCs as involving some 217 
form of human error.  A total of 74 investigation reports were included, all relating to minor safety-of-218 
the-line incidents occurring between January 2012 and May 2014. None of the incidents included in 219 
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this study had been investigated by the Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB), who investigate any 220 
accidents causing death, serious injuries, or extensive damage, or incidents which had the potential 221 
to lead to these serious effects. 5 main types of incident were included:  222 
 Signals passed at danger (SPADs, N=21) 223 
 Fail to call incidents, where a train failed to stop at a booked station (N=15) 224 
 Station Overruns, where a train overran the booked platform at a station (N=19) 225 
 Stop Short incidents, where a train came to a stop at a station before all carriages were at the 226 
platform (N=10) 227 
 TPWS Activations, where, for example, a train driver failed to acknowledge a speed restriction 228 
warning (N=9) 229 
2.2 Data Coding & Analysis 230 
Investigation reports were independently coded by two Human Factors researchers. Prior to 231 
commencing the HFACS coding, information about each incident was extracted, including a 232 
description of the incident type, the location, and date. Each coder also rated the quality of the 233 
investigation report as low, medium, or high depending on the amount of information included in the 234 
report and the evidence provided for any conclusions drawn. Each report was then read in its entirety 235 
and each contributing/safety factor identified in the incident narrative was mapped to a unique HFACS 236 
category following the procedure identified by Baysari et al. (2008) of using the definitions and tables 237 
provided in Wiegmann and Shappell (2003) and the flow-charts included in Viale and Reinach (2006). 238 
For example, in one report the investigator described a sign that was obscured by undergrowth. This 239 
was extracted as a contributory factor and coded under the Physical Environment HFACS code.  The 240 
presence or the absence of each HFACS category was assessed in each accident report narrative. More 241 
than one category or sub-category could be identified at each level. However, to avoid over-242 
representation from any single accident, each HFACS sub-category was counted a maximum of only 243 
once per accident (Li & Harris, 2006). To begin the analysis process, each analyst first independently 244 
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coded 10 incidents. This coding was then discussed in detail to ensure a joint understanding prior to 245 
independently analysing the rest of the papers. Where disagreements in the final codes arose, these 246 
were discussed until a consensus was reached. 247 
Once the initial analysis had begun, it became apparent that a total of 18 of the contributory 248 
factors identified as belonging in the Environmental Factors category did not fit into either the physical 249 
or technological environment, but rather could be described as arising from the operational 250 
environment. These factors related to unscheduled operational occurrences that were a departure 251 
from the operational norm, and examples included situations where there was a highly unusual 252 
signalling pattern, or a train was re-routed. Therefore, an additional subcategory of Operational 253 
Environment was included for this analysis (see Table 1 for examples). 254 
 255 
Table 1: Examples of report elements that were included in the Operational Environment category 256 
1. A signalling fault led to modified working on the train route, requiring the use of hand signals to 
communicate with the signaller. 
2. A possession on a line led to the driver being directed onto a route that they were not familiar 
with. 
3. An unusual signalling sequence led to a driver being directed to a different platform than usual. 
Initial analysis of the incident characteristics and HFACS data were performed using frequency 257 
counts. Further analysis to evaluate the associations between HFACS levels and incident types were 258 
conducted using Chi Square analysis and adjusted standardized residuals (ASR). The ASR provides a 259 
measure of the strength of the difference between observed and expected values in situations when 260 
a cross-tabulation result is associated with more than one degree of freedom i.e. larger than a 2X2 261 
contingency table. An ASR with a value of 2 or greater indicates a lack of fit of the null hypothesis in a 262 
given cell (Sharpe, 2015).  263 
In order to evaluate interrater reliability the index of concordance was used to provide a 264 
percentage agreement, following the procedure set out in Olsen and Shorrock (2010). The proportion 265 
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of agreeing pairs of codes out of all the possible pairs of codes is calculated as follows: (agreements) 266 
/ (agreements + disagreements). Interrater consensus can then be reported as a figure between 0 and 267 
1 or as a percentage. This method takes into account the cases where coders disagreed, along with 268 
providing a method for including situations where there was a difference in the number of codes 269 
assigned between coders. A criterion of 70% agreement between coders was adopted as a reasonable 270 
minimum, in accordance with Wallace and Ross (2006) and Olsen and Shorrock (2010). 271 
3. Results  272 
3.1 Inter-Rater Reliability & Quality of Reports 273 
Prior to resolution of any discrepancies in coding between the two raters, the Index of 274 
Concordance was used to evaluate inter-rater reliability (Table 2). The results show that inter-coder 275 
consistency was well above the 70% threshold at both the descriptor and category levels for all 276 
variables other than Adverse Mental state where the consistency was 68.92%. This discrepancy will 277 
be discussed further in Section 3.2.  278 
It should be noted that the quality of the incident reports for each of these incident types 279 
varied quite substantially across incident types (see Figure 2), leading to the identification of fewer 280 
contributory factors where the quality was low. Reports categorised as being of low quality generally 281 
contained only tick box information with no supporting data, medium quality reports contained a good 282 
description of the incident with support data and information, but generally did not have a systematic 283 
approach to evaluating human factors. High quality reports contained a good level of support data 284 
and an attempt to systematically evaluate contributory human factors. In general Category A SPADs, 285 
Station Overrun and Fail to Call reports tended to be of a high or medium quality, whereas TPWS 286 
Activation and Stop Short reports tended to have less detail.  287 
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Figure 2: Quality of investigation reports across incident types  289 
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Table 2: Inter-rater reliability (prior to resolution) and Frequency counts (post-resolution for each HFACS 290 
categorya 291 
Error Categories Error Subcategories % Agreement  Frequencya % Reports 
Operator Acts     
Skill Based Attention 77.03 42 56.76 
 Memory 81.08 31 41.89 
Decision Error Poor Choice 86.49 9 12.16 
Perceptual Error  98.65 1 1.35 
Violation Routine Violation 98.65 2 2.70 
 Exceptional Violation 98.65 1 1.35 
 Acts of Sabotage 100 0 0 
Preconditions to Unsafe 
Acts 
  
 
 
Environmental Factor Physical Environment 97.30 6 8.11 
 Technological Environment 83.79 13 17.57 
 Operational Environment 72.97 18 24.32 
Personnel Factor Crew Resource 
Management 
97.30 6 8.11 
 Personal Readiness 91.89 7 9.46 
Condition of Operator Adverse Mental State 68.92 63 85.14 
 Adverse Physiological State 90.54 12 16.22 
 Physical/Mental Limitations 90.54 10 13.51 
Supervisory Factors     
Inadequate Supervision  97.30 2 2.70 
Planned Inappropriate 
Operations 
 100.00 0 0 
Failure to Correct Known 
Problem 
 91.89 6 8.11 
Supervisory Violations  100.00 2 0 
Organisational Factors     
Resource Management  94.59 2 2.70 
Organisational Climate  100.00 2 2.70 
Organisational Process  93.24 4 5.41 
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Organisational Violations  100.00 0 0 
a More than one category could be identified at each of the HFACS levels 292 
3.2 Can HFACS help us to identify the precursors of minor operational incidents which 293 
have the potential to lead to more serious events? 294 
It was possible to code all of the contributing factors using our edited version of HFACS 295 
including Operational Environment. The presence of HFACS codes in the 74 incidents is presented in 296 
Table 2. A total of 228 contributory factors were identified, with an average of 4.05 factors (SD=1.07) 297 
per incident. 298 
Unsafe acts were identified in all of the reports investigated. The most frequent Level 1 unsafe 299 
acts were skill-based errors (87.84%). Of these skill-based errors, the majority involved some type of 300 
attentional failure (56.76% incidents) such as failing to notice the status of a signal or getting 301 
distracted. 41.89% of the skill based errors involved an issue with memory e.g. forgetting a station 302 
stop. A decision error was identified in 12.16% of reports, all of which involved a poor choice e.g. not 303 
making any attempt to stop at a station because of weather conditions. Finally, only 4.05% of unsafe 304 
acts involved a violation, 2 of which were routine violations e.g. drivers always stopping at a certain 305 
incorrect part of a platform to avoid passengers having to walk out in the rain, and one of which was 306 
an exceptional violation involving a failure to clarify instructions.  307 
One or more of the Level 2 preconditions for unsafe acts were evident in almost all incidents 308 
investigated, with one exception (a TPWS Activation). Adverse mental state was identified as a 309 
precondition in 85.16% incidents. Operational environment (24.32%), technological environment 310 
(17.57%), adverse physiological state (16.22%), and physical/mental limitations (13.51%) were all also 311 
identified as Level 2 contributory factors in 10 or more incidents. Unlike the pattern for other 312 
industries, crew resource management was not a pre-dominant causal factor, and only emerged in 313 
8.11% incidents. 314 
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As adverse mental state was deemed to be quite a broad category, and was also the category 315 
where the inter-rater reliability was lowest, it was decided to explore the themes which emerged 316 
within this category further (see Figure 3). Five main themes emerged. The most commonly identified 317 
adverse mental state was work-related distraction, which occurred when drivers claimed to have been 318 
distracted by thinking about something which had occurred during work hours - including problems in 319 
the environment, time pressures, or previous driving patterns. Non-work related distraction occurred 320 
when the driver was distracted by thinking about non-work issues e.g. relationship problems. Lapses 321 
in concentration occurred when the driver claimed to have stopped concentrating on the task for no 322 
particular reason. A preconception refers to situations in which the driver had made an incorrect 323 
assumption about what would happen next. Finally, poor attitude – not following procedures correctly 324 
to avoid having a fault on record - was identified as contributory factor in one incident. As Figure 3 325 
shows, drivers were considerably more likely to be distracted by work-related issues than non-work 326 
related ones. Of the 31 cases in which work-related distraction was identified, environmental issues 327 
were also identified in 18 of these reports (58.06%), suggesting a strong link between any unexpected 328 
changes to the driving environment and the propensity for the driver to lose focus. The weaker inter-329 
rater reliability of adverse mental state can be accounted for by the fact that one rater was more 330 
inclined to only identify the environmental code in these cases, where the other rater selected both 331 
categories.  332 
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 333 
Figure 3: Breakdown of themes emerging in Adverse Mental State category 334 
Finally, Level 3 supervisory factors and Level 4 organisational factors were both only identified in 335 
10.81% investigations. Failure to correct a problem (8.11%) was the most common supervisory factor, 336 
usually resulting from a failure to implement development changes identified in previous incidents. 337 
The most common Organisational Factor was organisational process (5.41%), usually arising from poor 338 
practice and procedures.  339 
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3.3 Are there any differences in the causation paths of different types of incident? 340 
Table 3: Frequency counts across Incident Types for each HFACS category 341 
Error Categories Error 
Subcategories 
% Cat A 
SPAD 
% Fail to 
Call 
% Station 
Overrun 
% Stop 
Short  
% TPWS 
Activation 
Operator Acts       
Skill Based Attention 95.24 26.67 42.11 20.00 88.89 
 Memory 9.52 86.67 63.16 30.00 0 
Decision Error Poor Choice 4.76 13.33 5.26 40.00 11.11 
Perceptual Error  4.76 0 0 0 0 
Violation Routine 
Violation 
4.76 0 0 10.00 0 
 
Exceptional 
Violation 
4.76 0 0 0 0 
Preconditions to 
Unsafe Acts 
      
Environmental Factor Physical 
Environment 
4.76 13.33 5.26 0 22.22 
Technological 
Environment 
23.98 13.33 15.79 30.00 0 
Operational 
Environment 
47.61 33.33 5.26 20.00 0 
Personnel Factor Crew Resource 
Management 
14.29 13.33 5.26 0 0 
Personal 
Readiness 
14.29 0 15.79 0 11.11 
Condition of Operator Adverse Mental 
State 
85.71 93.33 94.74 70.00 66.67 
Adverse 
Physiological 
State 
9.52 6.67 26.31 10.00 33.33 
Physical/Mental 
Limitations 
19.05 6.67 5.26 30.00 11.11 
       
Supervisory Factors       
Inadequate 
Supervision 
 4.76 0 0 0 11.11 
Planned Inappropriate 
Operations 
 0 0 0 0 0 
Failure to Correct 
Known Problem 
 19.05 0 0 20.00 0 
Supervisory Violations  0 0 0 0 0 
Organisational Factors       
Resource Management  9.52 0 0 0 0 
Organisational Climate  0 0 10.52 0 0 
Organisational Process  4.76 0 5.26 10.00 11.11 
Organisational 
Violations 
 0 0 0 0 0 
 342 
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Table 3 shows that there was a difference in the pattern of contributory factors for each of 343 
the five incident types. In order to determine where significant differences between the groups 344 
emerged a series of chi-square analyses were conducted. Three of these relationships reached 345 
significance and these are explored further in Table 4 and Figure 4.  346 
Table 4: Significant associations between HFACS categories and incident type 347 
Incident Type  Attention Error Memory Error Operational Environment 
  χ2=28.26 (df=4) p<0.001 χ2=31.05, df=4, p<0.001 χ2=13.79 (df=4), p<0.01 
Category A SPAD Observed 20 2 10 
 Expected 12.1 8.3 5.2 
 ASR a 4.1 -3.4 2.9 
Fail to Call Observed 4 12 5 
 Expected 8.1 5.6 3.5 
 ASR a -2.4 3.9 1.1 
Station Overrun Observed 8 12 1 
 Expected 10.9 7.5 4.7 
 ASR a -1.6 2.4 -2.3 
Stop Short Observed 2 3 2 
 Expected 5.8 4.0 2.5 
 ASR a -2.6 -0.7 -0.4 
TPWS Activation Observed 8 0 0 
 Expected 5.2 3.6 2.2 
 ASR a 2.0 -2.6 -1.8 
aASR = adjusted standardized residual 348 
At level 1 of the HFACS framework, attention and memory errors were both significantly 349 
associated with incident type. For Category A SPADs (ASR=4.1) and TPWS Activations (ASR=2.0), 350 
attentional errors were over-represented. However for Fail to Call (ASR=3.9) and Station Overrun 351 
incidents (ASR=2.4), memory errors were over-represented. This suggests that attention and memory 352 
errors lead to different outcomes, and thus different initiatives will have to be taken to address each 353 
incident type.  354 
At level 2 of the HFACS framework, operational environment was the only variable to be 355 
significantly associated with incident type. This category was significantly over-represented in 356 
Category A SPADs (ASR=2.9). This suggests that Category A SPADs are more likely to occur after some 357 
change in the operational environment. 358 
21 
 
There were no significant associations between Level 3 and Level 4 factors and incident type.   359 
 360 
Figure 4. Percentages related to significant associations between HFACS categories and incident type 361 
4. Discussion  362 
The aim of the study was to examine the active and latent causal factors of minor safety of 363 
the line incidents, using the HFACS methodology, and one purpose of the research was to understand 364 
the utility of HFACS for the task at hand. A number of specific research questions were outlined, which 365 
are addressed below. 366 
4.1 Can HFACS help us to identify the precursors of minor operational incidents? 367 
74 minor incident investigations were analysed using HFACS to identify the factors which 368 
contribute to the occurrence of these types of events. In total, 228 contributory factors were identified 369 
and classified from the reports. The findings provide some initial evidence that the pattern of 370 
contributory factors for minor incidents is similar to that identified in more serious incidents (e.g. 371 
Baysari et al., 2008, Read et al., 2012), at least in terms of the Level 1 and Level 2 contributory factors.  372 
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Consistent with previous research in both rail (Baysari et al., 2008, Reinach & Viale, 2006) and 373 
other sectors (e.g. ElBardissi et al., 2007; Lenné et al., 2012; Li & Harris), skill-based errors emerged as 374 
the most common contributory factor at Level 1, with more attentional than memory errors arising. 375 
However, unlike previous studies, very few violations occurred, with only 2 routine violations and 1 376 
exceptional violation identified. This suggests that minor incidents are more likely to be caused by an 377 
error or mistake than by a deliberate breach of rules. Adverse mental state was the most common 378 
Level 2 category, followed by operational environment, technological environment, and adverse 379 
physiological state. Baysari et al. (2008) also identified adverse mental state as the most common 380 
precondition and, indeed, adverse mental state and environmental factors consistently emerge as 381 
strong contributory factors across a range of sectors, although the order of importance may vary (e.g. 382 
Li & Harris, 2006; Shappell et al., 2007, Lenné et al., 2012). However, in both aviation and medicine, 383 
Crew Resource Management (CRM) also emerges as a common contributory factor (e.g. ElBardissi et 384 
al., 2007; Li et al., 2008; Shappell et al., 2007), which was not identified in this study.  This is most likely 385 
a result of the more solitary nature of the train driver role compared to that of an airline pilot or 386 
medical surgeon.  387 
Adverse mental state was the most commonly identified category across all of the incidents 388 
investigated. As it is quite a broad category, a deeper analysis was deemed necessary and it was, 389 
therefore, further broken down into 5 main themes. This analysis showed that distraction due to work-390 
related issues was the single biggest contributory factor. Some caution should be taken in interpreting 391 
this result, as this finding arises from self-report aspects of the report and it is possible that drivers 392 
were unable to accurately remember, or chose to misrepresent what they had been thinking about 393 
prior to an incident. However, the fact that environmental factors, in particular operational 394 
environment, were also identified as a causal factor in over half of the reports suggests that work-395 
related distraction is a real issue in incident causation.   396 
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Linked to this, one of the key findings of this study was the importance of the operational 397 
environment. The items in this category were environmental factors that were not overtly physical 398 
(e.g. weather) or technical (e.g. faulty equipment), but altered driving conditions based on operational 399 
circumstances - such as other late running trains in the area causing the incident-involved train to run 400 
on cautionary signals, or a temporary change to the station calling pattern. While these situations are 401 
well within the driver’s required competency, they were a deviation from planned or routine action.  402 
Cognitively, changes to the operational environment create a situation where the driver moves from 403 
a skill-based, proactive feedforward mode of control (Rasmussen, 1983; Hollnagel and Woods, 2005), 404 
to a more rule-based, and cognitively effortful (and error prone), reactive mode of control. To amplify 405 
the risk, this change of mode takes place just at that point where the driver is likely to be late or trying 406 
to preserve tight performance allowances in the timetable. Thus, they have the paradox of needing to 407 
work faster at a time when the environment demands, cognitively, that they take longer. Baysari et 408 
al.’s (2008) analysis of Australian railway incidents identified a similar issue, and they advocated the 409 
creation of an extra category of Task Factors at the preconditions for unsafe acts level – many of the 410 
factors they identified could also be considered as part of the Operational Environment.   411 
The problems identified in these analyses are not unique to the rail industry, and indeed similar 412 
incidents can easily be identified in other industries. For example, in aviation a flight path may have 413 
to be changed at short notice, or in medicine a routine operation may become more complex due to 414 
unforeseeable complications. Thus, the addition of the category of Operational Environment to HFACS 415 
would provide an additional opportunity to understand the impact of alterations to planned routine 416 
on the propensity for incidents to occur.    417 
On the whole, these results highlight the potential power of minor incidents to provide valuable 418 
insights into common causal factors, at least at the unsafe acts and preconditions levels, and to 419 
reinforce some of the similarities (importance of skill-based error, and adverse mental state) and 420 
differences (few violations, increased emphasis on context including operational environment, 421 
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reduced emphasis on CRM) between train driving and other domains. This highlights that a simple 422 
transfer of initiatives, such as training programmes, from other domains (e.g. aviation) into train 423 
driving is not always appropriate, and indicates where adaption (e.g. an emphasis on attentional over 424 
CRM-type support) is required. 425 
4.2 Are there any differences in the causation paths of different types of incident e.g. 426 
SPAD vs station overrun. 427 
Although Li et al. (2013) had compared contributory factors across aircraft type, pilot rank, and 428 
flight phase; this is the first study to investigate the causes of specific incident types within a single 429 
study. Our results indicate that different types of railway incidents appear to have different causal 430 
pathways, at least in terms of the factors immediately preceding the incident. Of particular interest is 431 
the fact that any change in the Operational Environment e.g. a change in diagrammed stops, an 432 
unusual sequence of restrictive aspects; was found to be significantly linked to the occurrence of a 433 
SPAD. Although the SPAD investigations included in this study were relatively minor events with no 434 
major repercussions, similar circumstances have been identified in more serious incidents. As far back 435 
as 1997, a study of over 100 Australian railway incidents identified that the expectation of a green 436 
signal was one of the most common skill-based errors contributing to drivers passing a red signal 437 
(Edkins & Pollock, 1997), and recent major incident investigations have re-iterated this finding (e.g. 438 
RAIB, 2014). Similarly, Rjabovs and Palacin (2016) found that unfamiliar tasks and locations may play 439 
a role in safety of the line incidents in a metro environment. In our paper it may not be that the 440 
location was unfamiliar as such, but that the conditions in which the location was experienced may be 441 
unfamiliar or, at least, a divergence from the norm. This highlights the importance of providing 442 
additional support to drivers in situations which are more cognitively effortful, suggesting that 443 
interventions which specifically address the methods of communicating and alerting drivers to areas 444 
of importance during changes to the operational environment could be successful in reducing the 445 
occurrence of SPADs.   446 
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In addition, it appears that Category A SPADs and TPWS activations (which have the capacity 447 
to escalate to become a SPAD) were both more likely to be caused by an attentional failure, while Fail 448 
to Call and Station Overrun incidents were more likely to be caused by a memory failure. The fact that 449 
different causal paths are emerging suggests that companies need to take different approaches to 450 
how they address these incidents and, in some cases, technical solutions will be required, similar to 451 
the ones reported by Basacik and Gibson (2015) for wrong side door openings. Read, Lenné, and Moss 452 
(2012) found that task demand factors (e.g. high workload, distraction) were significantly associated 453 
with skill-based errors in Australian rail accidents. We have further broken this down to show how the 454 
impacts of different types of skill-based error (i.e. memory versus attention) can vary, suggesting that 455 
safety interventions need to be carefully targeted to maximise their benefits. For example, technical 456 
systems to more clearly alert drivers of diagrammed station stops may be beneficial in preventing Fail 457 
to Call and Station Overrun incidents, whereas improving communication of the likely risk areas during 458 
non-routine running may reduce the risk of a SPAD.  459 
4.3 What is the breakdown of active and latent factors that contribute to this type of 460 
incident, and does this vary across incident types? 461 
Active factors dominated the causes identified from the incident analysis. Due to the small 462 
number of organisational and supervisory factors identified, it was impossible to identify any causal 463 
paths originating at these levels.  In addition, some of the reports around TPWS activations, Stop Short, 464 
and Fail to Call incidents were of a low quality containing minimal information, which was usually 465 
related solely to driver error – no Supervisory or Organisational Factors were identified in any of the 466 
Fail to Call reports. In these reports it was often quite difficult to build a picture of the events which 467 
led up to the incident. Although, these incidents are often seen as quite minor, and companies have 468 
to make trade-offs in terms of the costs associated with detailed investigations; being able to address 469 
the causes of these minor incidents and eliminate them is likely to significantly reduce the risk of a 470 
more serious incident occurring (Wright & van der Schaaf, 2004), and result in greater savings in the 471 
long run. The fact that it was possible to identify differences in causal pathways from even basic quality 472 
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minor investigations provides evidence of the importance of using minor events and near misses to 473 
further our understanding of how safety systems can be improved.  474 
It is important to note, however, that even in reports with extensive data e.g. for SPADs or Station 475 
Overruns, there were still few references to organisational and supervisory issues, and many that were 476 
identified were cases where a driver had not yet completed relevant training after a prior incident 477 
(classified as ‘Failure to correct known problem’). This indicates an issue with the focus of reporting, 478 
discussed next. Certainly, the perception of driver error as captured in the reports is that the issues lie 479 
in active factors, and this reinforced by train operating companies’ interest in Non-Technical Skills 480 
programmes. 481 
4.4 What is the quality of reporting of minor incidents in the rail industry? 482 
Building on the point above, one of the questions entering into this study was whether reports 483 
contained enough detail to identify issues arising at the supervisory, organizational and regulatory 484 
levels. In practice the number of examples of this kind of factors in the data were few and far between. 485 
This is one of the major drawbacks of using HFACS as a tool to investigate more minor accidents, as 486 
several studies have found that systems approaches are hugely dependent on the quality of the data 487 
provided (e.g. Lenné et al., 2012). The majority of the investigations reported in this study were carried 488 
out by front-line supervisors rather than dedicated accident investigators, and thus it is perhaps 489 
unsurprising that these supervisors might be reluctant to find fault with themselves and, in many 490 
cases, their employers. Research shows that latent errors pose the greatest risk to system safety 491 
(Reason, 1990; 1997), and it is a key characteristic that these latent errors are the pre-conditions that 492 
enable active errors to occur. It is therefore important that organisations are able to identify these 493 
latent errors to mitigate against potentially serious accidents occurring in the future.  494 
However, it is important not to appear too critical of reporting. Of all 74 reports identified by train 495 
operators as being related to human error, all did cover human error and presented issues that fitted 496 
naturally within HFACS. None presented information that suggested a significant misclassification of 497 
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the report (e.g. that it was primarily a technical fault). This suggests a good level of understanding of 498 
basic human factors within the industry, and further work could help to refine or expand that 499 
understanding to seek out more latent factors. Further work to develop investigation and reporting 500 
around supervisory, organisation and external factors should not just look to support accident analysis 501 
using HFACS. This level of reporting would also help assist in the identification of causes of accident 502 
using systems-orientated approaches such as STAMP (Leveson, 2004) and Accimap (Rasmussen, 503 
1997). 504 
4.5 How reliably can two independent Human Factors experts code investigation reports 505 
using HFACS 506 
On the whole, the research team found HFACS to be a straightforward tool to use, although it was 507 
not without its flaws. Previous research had identified problems with inter-rater reliability, and 508 
difficulties in identifying the level at which factors should be categorised (Olsen, 2011; Olsen & 509 
Shorrock, 2010; Baysari et al., 2008). Olsen (2011) investigated the success of air traffic controllers and 510 
human factors specialists in applying HFACS consistently and found that neither group achieved 511 
acceptable agreement levels between raters. However, this was not a problem in the current study, 512 
with inter-rater reliability reaching an acceptable level in all categories other than Adverse Mental 513 
State, where it was just below the 70% agreement level advocated. Prior to beginning the coding 514 
process, both raters had spent some time agreeing on their interpretation of each of the categories 515 
and this may have aided the coding process. Also, all incidents had already been classified by the train 516 
operating companies as relating to human error, which again may have reduced some of the scope 517 
for variance.  518 
4.6 Limitations 519 
A limitation of this study, particularly for TPWS activation and Stop Short events was the lack 520 
of data in the reports, and, as noted above, all of the reports lacked information on supervisory and 521 
organisational factors. This, coupled with a modest sample size of 74 investigation reports, limits the 522 
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depth of conclusions that can be drawn from the reports regarding causal factors. As noted under data 523 
quality, a second factor is the potential bias in the reports through the reliance on the skills of the line 524 
managers and supervisors as investigators. These investigators could not be assumed to have 525 
extensive training or knowledge of Human Factors, and may have a personal relationship with the 526 
driver they were interviewing. Thirdly, putting aside the role of the investigator, the drivers were asked 527 
to recall their thoughts and mental states at the time of the incident. This is also likely to be biased, 528 
and caution must be taken when interpreting any self-report data. A final limitation is that HFACS was 529 
the only interpretation tool used in the study. While the aims of the study were practical, rather than 530 
a study of methodology, it might be useful to compare different tool outputs e.g. Accimap (Rasmussen, 531 
1997), STAMP (Leveson, 2004), along with the Incident Factor Classification Study which is being 532 
adopted in the UK rail section (Gibson et al., 2015).  533 
5. Conclusions 534 
The current study successfully applies HFACS to provide a retrospective analysis of minor 535 
incident investigations in the rail industry. Such examination of minor incidents provides a much wider 536 
scope for us to interpret accident causal pathways, as these incidents occur much more frequently 537 
than more serious incidents. By highlighting the differences in the causes of different incident types, 538 
a greater level of understanding of the mechanisms required to prevent future incidents is achieved.   539 
Active failures, specifically those related to attention and adverse mental state, dominate the 540 
results, suggesting that measures to reduce safety of the line incidents should be targeted at these 541 
areas. However, it is important to stress that training approaches should not be the only solution, and 542 
more systemic solutions are also required. Currently, supervisory and organisational issues are under-543 
represented in the reports, and therefore more efforts should be made to identify latent factors that 544 
might be setting up the preconditions for active failures. Uncovering these latent errors may need rail 545 
companies to refine the current approach to minor incident investigation, in order to ensure that all 546 
factors can be identified, not only those relating to the competency or attitude of the driver. 547 
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Finally, this study has also identified the importance of the operational environment in 548 
shaping risk. Gibson et al (2015) put the case that as an aggregate, performance may be approaching 549 
a ceiling, and that further investigation is required to target specific locations or circumstances that 550 
might lead to error. From this analysis, we argue that operational environment may be one of those 551 
factors. To test this, one could compare the risk of SPAD for signals approached at red when 552 
operational conditions were out of the norm, from those approached in normal circumstances. If 553 
operational environment is a factor, then SPAD risk will be found to be higher. Also, it would also be 554 
interesting to investigate whether similar differences emerge in the causal factors of incidents on 555 
different types of routes (e.g. high-speed trains versus metro-links). 556 
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